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Abstract 
Modal logics are currently widely accepted as a suitable tool of knowledge representation, and 
the question what logics are better suited for representing knowledge is of particular importance. 
Usually, some axiom list is given, and arguments are presented justifying that suggested axioms 
agree with intuition. The question why the suggested axioms describe all the desired properties 
of knowledge remains answered only partially, by showing that the most obvious and popular 
additional axioms would violate the intuition. 
We suggest he general paradigm of maximal logics and demonstrate how it can work for 
nonmonotonic modal logics. Technically, we prove that each of the modal logics KD45, SW5, 
S4F and S4.2 is the strongest modal logic among the logics generating the same nonmonotonic 
logic. These logics have already found important applications in knowledge representation, and 
the obtained results contribute to the explanation of this fact. 
1. Introduction 
The idea of using modal logics to capture semantics of knowledge and belief is due, 
probably, to Hintikka [ 71. The idea was to interpret the necessitation modality L as “is 
believed” or “is known”. 
There has been much argument among philosophers around the question, what is the 
“true” logic of knowledge and/or belief be (see [ 121 for a comprehensive survey). 
Many different axioms and systems have been proposed, argued pro and contra. It is 
now clear that notions of knowledge and belief are important in fields such as artificial 
intelligence, economics, computer science. Reasoning about knowledge became subject 
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of interdisciplinary conferences attracting prominent researchers in all the above fields. 
A survey of reasoning about knowledge, emphasizing its interdisciplinary character, and 
especially research of “applied epistemology” in computer science, can be found in [ 51. 
Importance of epistemic notions for artificial intelligence was stressed and illustrated by 
McCarthy [ 171, McCarthy and Hayes [ 1X I. 
While philosophers were mostly interested in the questions “what is the ‘true’ logic 
of knowledge and belief”, the most important question of knowledge related research in 
Al is, how to apply logic of knowledge (and, more generally, logic at all) in concrete 
situations. 
Robert Moore [ 231 argued that nonmonotonicity is a natural property of autoepis- 
temic reasoning, that is. reasoning of a rational agent capable of reasoning about its 
own knowledge and belief. In fact we feel that logic of knowledge as it is discussed 
in philosophical literature is, in a sense, “autoepistemic”. Its autoepistemic character 
becomes clear as we try to see how the nested modalities are interpreted. Say, the 
sentence K( Kv > cp) means “the agent knows that if it knows lp then cp”. That is. 
everything in scope of the outer K reflects the agent’s reasoning, and embedded K’s 
relate agent’s self-reflection. The novelty of Moore’s approach was that all the sentences 
(“axioms” and “theorems”) were supposed to represent agent’s belief rather than the 
real world. So the “axioms” are interpreted as “initial beliefs” of an agent, and theorems 
are supposed to represent final beliefs based on initial beliefs. So, roughly speaking, 
an external epistemic operator is always implicitly assumed. Following Moore’s work, 
other nonmonotonic formalisms for knowledge and belief have been suggested (see, 
e.g., [ 14, 151. 
We illustrate the natural nonmonotonicity of the logic of knowledge by the following 
simple example. Assume that p is some elementary statement, and assume that the initial 
belief set (or knowledge base) is empty. Then it is natural to assume that ‘Kp is the 
autoepistemic consequence of Q). We can write this fact as 8 kae -Kp. But now consider 
the initial belief set {p}. Then, of course, it is quite natural to assume {p} I-,, Kp, and 
{p} i;/;,r 1Kp: if p is in the knowledge set of an agent, then the self-reflecting agent 
should be able to conclude that it knows p. 
Thus, the modal logic of knowledge/belief should be applied in some nonmonotonic 
way. Note however that philosophers were interested mostly in “pure” logics of knowl- 
edge and belief, the questions of “applied logics” remained uninvestigated. As long as 
we consider “pure logics”, that is we do not have any nonlogical axioms specific to a 
given situation, the question of nonmonotonicity simply does not arise. 
The basic idea of nonmonotonic versions of monotonic modal logics was suggested by 
McDermott and Doyle in [ 19,201. They did not state explicitly epistemic interpretation 
of modalities. However Moore’s analysis [ 231 applies to McDermott and Doyle’s logic 
too. An earlier disregard of McDermott and Doyle’s approach was due, to the large 
extent, to the unsuccessful choice of the underlying monotonic modal logic-namely, it 
turned out that the popular logic S.5 does not give any nonmonotonicity. However, it was 
proved in [ 301 that Moore’s autoepistemic logic is, formally, a special case of McDer- 
mott and Doyle’s logic, if we take the logic KD45 as an underlying monotonic basis. 
Subsequently, formal properties of McDermott and Doyle’s logics were investigated in 
much detail [ 16,301. Epistemic analysis of McDermott’s scheme and comparison with 
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other approaches to the problem of formalizing autoepistemic reasoning was sketched 
in [28]. 
The present paper is an attempt to contribute to the problem “what is a good logic 
of knowledge” by solving some formal problems. We look at the problem from the 
nonmonotonic standpoint. First, let us note that we do not think that some logic is the 
“true” logic of knowledge: the very notions of knowledge and belief are too vague and 
too complicated. Moreover, it is sometimes reasonable and convenient to consider some 
logic as a suitable logic of knowledge for some particular applications, even realizing 
that its axioms do not correspond fully to intuitive meaning of knowledge (see, e.g., 
[ 51) . Our goal here is to give arguments that some of the logics are more reasonable 
than others, and some are in fact indistinguishable, if considered from the point of 
view of knowledge representation. Such results, we think, are also of philosophical 
importance, because if we show that two modal logics are indistinguishable from the 
epistemic standpoints, the possible discussion of “which of these two logics is better” 
becomes unnecessary. 
Let us recall McDermott and Doyle’s construction. Assume we have a (monotonic) 
modal logic S with the basic (necessitation) modality L interpreted as “is known” or 
“is believed”. 
Let S be any monotonic logic in L. By an S-expansion of A we mean a set T of 
formulas such that 
T = (40: A u {lLt,k (/I $ T} Es cp}. (1) 
Intuitively, an S-expansion may be understood as a knowledge set (or as a belief 
set) of a rational agent based on initial assumptions A. It is an analogue to the notion 
of a deductive closure of an axiom set. In usual monotonic setting, if two logics are 
(extensionally) different then they give raise to different deductive closures of the same 
axiom set (say, deductive closures of the empty set of axioms are always different 
for different logics). The situation for nonmonotonic logics is different. It may happen 
that two different monotonic modal logics S and 7 give rise to the same nonmonotonic 
modal logic in a sense that for each A and for each consistent set T, T is an S-expansion 
of A if and only if T is a I-expansion of A. In this case we will say that S and 7 are 
in the same range. ’ 
The reason two monotonically different logics may generate the same expansions, 
is the presence of the negative introspection term {yL+: 1+4 $! T} in E@. (1): say, if 
S c 7, it may happen that all the axiom schemata of I are derivable from the negative 
introspection and S. Clearly, in this case all consistent 7-expansions are S-expansions, 
too. 
The possibility for different monotonic modal logics to collapse into one nonmono- 
tonic modal logic was first noticed in [ 161, and a few ranges were exhibited. For 
instance, all logics between the logic with the only axiom schema 5 (ALP > L7Lq) 
and KD45 are in the same range (and coincide with the autoepistemic logic of Moore). 
’ The usage of the term “range” here is motivated by a result of McDermott [ 191 stating that if S & 7, 
then each S-expansion of A is also a I-expansion of A; hence if S c 7 are in the same range, then all the 
logics between S and 7 are in the same range, too. 
Our point here is that, if two modal logics are in the same range, then they are 
indistinguishable as epistemic logics. Among the logics in the same range, the largest 
logic is of particular interest: it states explicitly all the general epistemological principles 
that hold in the logic, so it gives us the maximum available information about the logic. 
For instance, it follows from the results of [26] that KD45 is a maximal logic in its 
range: that is, there does not exist a logic in the same range which properly contains 
KD45. That is, all the general epistemic principles that follow from KD45 and negative 
introspection are already contained in KD45. Such result, in our opinion, is an additional 
justification for the special interest this logic has received recently in the AI research. 
In this paper we strengthen this result. We prove that KD45 is not just maximal, but 
the largest in its range: each logic which generates the same nonmonotonic logic, is 
contained in KD45. So we rule out the possibility that some logic incomparable with 
KD45 could be “nonmonotonically indistinguishable” from KD45. In fact, we prove 
even stronger result: if a logic S is contained in S5 and has any theorem not derivable 
in KD45, then there is a theory A such that some S-expansion of A is not a KD45- 
expansion of A. ’ 
Similarly, the maximality of two more logics, S4.4 and S4F was proved in [ 25,28 ] ; 
we strengthen these results by proving that these logics are largest in their ranges. 
But our main motivation for writing this paper was the famous logic S4. The segment 
of logics between S4 and S5 has been especially attractive to epistemologists (see, e.g.. 
[ l-31 ). S4 and S5 are the best known modal logics. It has been much argued that S4 is 
a true logic of knowledge. Moore 1221 used S4 as a basis for his theory of knowledge 
and action. In [ 301 it was shown that using nonmonotonic S4 rather than Moore’s 
autoepistemic logic (= nonmonotonic KD45) some intuitively undesirable properties of 
Moore’s autoepistemic logic (mentioned in [ lO,24] ) can be avoided. 
On the other hand, Lenzen [ 131 argued that S4.2 rather than S4 is the “true” logic of 
knowledge. In this paper we show that S4 and S4.2 are in the same range, moreover, S4.2 
is the largest logic in that range. This means that if we accept that logic of knowledge 
is nonmonotonic, then S4.2 and S4 do not differ. On the other hand, as S4.2 is the 
largest logic in this range, this means that Lenzen was right in stressing the special role 
of S4.2 as an epistemic logic: it does not imply any hidden general epistemic principles 
but those explicitly formulated in S4.2, and their logical consequences. 
The situation with S4 is especially intriguing in the following respect. It was proved in 
[ 161 that for each$nite set of sentences, A, a consistent set T is an SCexpansion of A if 
and only if T is an S4F-expansion of A. It was also proved that S4-expansions coincide 
with S4F-expansions for sets A having only positive occurrences of the modality L, and 
for A’s without nested modalities, having only negative occurrences of L. Thus, it is 
clear that examples of theories A demonstrating that nonmonotonic logics between S4 
and S4F are different should be rather sophisticated (one such example was presented in 
[ 161). The authors of [ 161 hoped, because of strong positive results, that there should 
be not too many “nonmonotonically different” logics between S4 and S4F. However, the 
? We argue in the next section that only log~cs contained in SS are of interest in the nonmonotonic context: 
however, for a more rigorous reader we prove that a logic not contained in S5 always has an expansion of an 
P) which cannot be an expansion for any logic contained in SS. 
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methods of this paper allow us to construct infinitely many logics between S4.2 and S4.3 
generating different nonmonotonic logics. More precisely, we give the infinite sequence 
of logics {Zn}n such that for each n, S4.2 is properly contained in In+,, In+1 is properly 
contained in I,,, Ii is S4.3, and each I,, is the largest logic in its range (therefore, all 
Z,, are different). Originally we were not going to consider all these logic, believing 
that they are irrelevant for knowledge representation (traditionally, S4.3 is considered 
as a tense logic with the operator “always in future”). However, recently Boutilier [ l] 
found interesting applications of S4.3. Logic S4.3 also naturally appears in the work of 
Lamarre and Shoham [ 1 I] devoted to the investigation of relationships between different 
epistemic modalities, so we believe that it would be both interesting and useful to take a 
look at nonmonotonic S4.3. It is still an open question, what happens between S4.3 and 
S4F. By using methods of [ 161, it is not difficult to prove that all logics of finite depth 
contained in S4F 3 are in the same range of S4F. However, there are infinitely many 
logics of infinite depth between S4.3 and S4F (see [ 21). Because all the extensions of 
S4.3 were effectively described by Fine [ 21, it should be not too difficult to find how 
many nonmonotonically different logics are between S4.3 and S4F. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains necessary prelimi- 
naries of modal logic and nonmonotonic modal logic. In particular, Section 2.2 contains 
description of semantics of nonmonotonic modal logics, previously published in [ 261. In 
Section 3 we strengthen earlier results of [25,28] and show that KD45, SW5 and S4F 
are strongest logics in their ranges. Another purpose of that section is to demonstrate 
the main idea of the technique we use in Section 4 to prove that S4.2 is the strongest 
logic in the range of S4. The proof of the result for S4.2 is much more technically 
complicated than, say, for S4F, but the basic idea is the same. Section 5 presents a 
paradigm of maximal logics, explains significance of obtained technical results for the 
KR theory, suggests directions for further research. 
Short proofs are presented in the main body of the paper, whereas longer proofs are 
presented in Appendix A. Finally, some technical results about logics between S4.2 and 
SW5, which we feel are of lesser conceptual significance, are presented in Appendix B. 
2. Preliminaries 
2.1. Modal logics 
We deal in the paper with propositional modal logics only. We write L for the necessity 
operator. The dual to L, the possibility operator M, is considered as an abbreviation to 
,Ll. We refer the reader to [8] for the basics of modal logics. All modal logics 
considered in the paper have two inference rules: modus ponens and necessitation 
(q/Lp) . The modal axiom schemata of interest b us are: 
3 Roughly speaking, logics of finite depth n are logics whose axioms may be falsified on each Kripke frame 
consisting of n + 1 consecutive clusters; say, S5 has depth 1, S4F and SW5 are of depth 2. 
K UP 3 rcI) 2 (LP J Q) 
4 L@ 3 LL* 
T L* I* 
D L* 3 Mf+b 
5 ML@ > Li,b 
WS $ > (ML@ > L@) 
F (cpA ML@) > L(Mpv$ ) 
2 ML@ > LMIC, 
3 L(Lp 3 9, v L(Lg .~I cp) 
All logics discussed in the paper are rrot~ral. that is, contain the schema K. S.5 is the 
logic based on schemata K, T, 4 and 5; S4 contains K, T and 4; T contains K and T, 
SW5 is S4 with the schema WS, S4F is S4 with F, S4.2 is S4 with the schema 2. In 
other cases, we will simply concatenate names of schemata a modal logic is based on 
(for example, KD45). 
Logics SW5 and S4F are not widely known. However, these logics are rather old 
and have been known in classical modal logic for a long time under the names S4.4 
and S4.3.2. Formal properties of these logics were investigated in detail by Segerberg 
1291. Lenzen [ 131 investigated SW5 from the epistemological point of view and gave 
arguments in favor of SW5 as a logic of true belief. In [28] interesting applications of 
logic S4F to knowledge representation were found. 
Let S be a modal logic, A be a set of formulas. We write A FS (I/ to denote that 
formula I/J is derivable from A in S. That means that there exist a sequence of formulas 
cpl , . , (pn such that C+CJ,! is $, and Ihr each i. 1 < i < n, at least one of the following 
conditions holds: 
. P,EA; 
0 cp; is a propositional tautology: 
l C,O~ is an instance of a modal axiom schema of the logic S; 
l for some j, k < i, C,O~ has the form ‘p, 2 cp,: 
l cp; has the form Lpk for some k < i. 
We write A F sl, to denote that CL is a propositional consequence of A (in the modal 
language). 
We assume the notion of a Kripke model and basics of Kripke models to be known 
(see. c.g. [ 81). Here we recall some notation. A Kripke model is a triple M = 
(M, R, V), where M is a nonempty set of hvorlds, R is a binary relation on M (called 
also the accessibility relutiorz) and { Va}crE,~ is a family of propositional valuations. By 
(M, a) k Q we denote that a formula 9 is true in the world cy E M. Let us recall that 
(M, a) k L$ if and only if f or each p E M such that aRj3, (M,p) k +. We write 
M b ~4, if for each LY t M, {it!, LY) i_ 4. 
Let K: be a class of Kripke models, S be a modal logic. We say that S is determined 
hi K, if for each formula cp of the m&al language, FS p if and only if for each M E K, 
M I=P. 
A Kripke model of the form (M, M x M, V) is called an SS-model. It is well known 
that S5 is determined by the class of all SS-models. We will denote this %-model by 
CM, V). skipping the accessibility relation, which is uniquely determined by M. 
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A KD45-model is a Kripke model of the form ({a} U M, ( {a} U M) x M, V) , where 
M is nonempty (thus, if CY E M, then a KD45-model is an SS-model). An SWS-model 
is a Kripke model of the form ({cr} U M, R, V), where M is nonempty, and yRP if and 
only if p E M or y = LY. Thus, a KD45-model consists of an SS-model and an h-reflexive 
world below the SS-model; an SWS-model is an SS-model plus a reflexive world below 
the model. We will call the corresponding SS-model an upper cluster of the KD45-model 
(or SWS-model). It was proved in [29] that the logic KD45 (respectively SW5) is 
determined by class of all KD45-models (respectively SWS-models). Moreover, both 
KD45 and SW5 have the finite model property, that is, KD45 (SW5) is determined by 
the class of all finite KD45-models (respectively SWS-models). 
A Kripke model (M, R, V) is an S4F-model, if M is a disjoint union of its subsets 
Ml and M2, and for each (Y and p, aR/3 if and only if (Y E Ml or p E MT. Clearly, 
Ml and Mz are uniquely determined for an S4F-model; we call M2 an upper cluster, 
and Ml a lower cluster of the model. It was proved by Segerberg [29] that S4F is 
determined by the classes of all S4F-models, and of all finite S4F-models. 
A model M = (M, R, V) is an S4.2-model, if R is a directed relation on M, that 
is, for each CX, p E M there is some y E M such that aRy and PRy. Logic S4.2 is 
determined by classes of all directed frames, and of all finite directed frames [ 8,291. 
If R is also connected, that is, for each cy,p E M, aR/? or PRa, then M is also an 
S4.3-model. Again, S4.3 is determined by classes of all connected, and of all finite 
connected models. 
Assume that (M, R, V) is a finite Kripke model with directed R. Consider the set 
MO = {p E M: b’y E M(PRy 4 yRP)}. 
It is easy to see that MO is a final cluster (that is, for each LY, /3 E MO, aR/3; for each 
LY E MO, for each p E M, PRcY; if CYRP and (Y E MO, then p E MO). Also, because M is 
finite, MO is nonempty (otherwise there would exist an infinite sequence of worlds {ai}i 
such that for each i, aiRai+i and not (Yi+i Rai; because R is transitive and reflexive, all 
the ai must be different). 
Thus, each finite directed (in particular, connected) model has the nonempty final 
cluster. 
We will use also some stronger completeness results than just listed. Let K: be a class 
of Kripke models. We will say that a modal logic S is characterized by Ic, if for each 
set A of formulas, for each formula (p, A ES 40 if and only if for each M E K, M b A 
implies M + cp. It is well known that S4 is characterized by class of all transitive 
reflexive models, S4.2 is characterized by the class of all reflexive transitive directed 
models, S4.3 is characterized by the class of all connected models, S4F is characterized 
by the class of all S4F-models. Note, however, that, for instance, S4 is not characterized 
by the class of all finite transitive and reflexive models, although S4 is determined by 
this class of models. 
If K is a class of frames, then we say that S is determined (characterized) by x if 
S is determined (characterized) by the class of all models based on frames in x. 
By using standard canonical model technique [8,19], it is straightforward to show 
that S4.2 is also characterized by class of all directed models with the final cluster, and 
S4.3 is characterized by class of all connected models with the final cluster. 
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2.2. Nonmonotonic modal logics and their semantics 
The basic notion of nonmonotonic modal logic is the notion of an expansion of a 
given axiom set. Let S be any monotonic logic in C. By an S-expansion ofA we mean 
a set T of formulas such that 
T={q Au{~Lt,k r/Q@T}ts(~}. 
A formula is called objective if it does not contain any occurrence of L. We denote 
by To the set of all objective formulas in T, by Cn(T) the set of all tautological 
consequences of T, and by Go(T) we denote (Cn(T))o. 
We always assume logic S to contain the necessitation rule (q/&p). Hence, each S- 
expansion T is stable, which means that: T is closed under the propositional consequence; 
for any p, if p +! T then ~Lqc E T; and for any p, if 9 E T then L+o E T. 
It was argued [ 6,231 that a knowledge set or a belief set of a rational agent must be 
stable. 
We now recall some important properties of expansions we use in subsequent sections. 
Proposition 2.1 (McDermott ( 19 1 ) Let S and I be modal logics, let S C 7 C S5. 
Then any S-expansion of A is a I-expansion qf A too. 
For a set A of objective formulas, we denote by B(A) the unique stable set whose 
objective part is Cno( A). For finite A, st( A) is decidable (see, e.g., [lo] ). We will use 
the following semantic characterization of St( A ) (described in [ 6,211. Let M = (M, I/) 
be an SS-model such that its set of worlds M consists of all propositional valuations 
making all the formulas in A true, and for each cy E M, U,(p) = a(p), for each 
propositional variable p. Then st( A) = Th( M). The above model M will be called the 
canonical %-model for A, or the canonical SS-model of T. 
If for each theory A, for each T. T is a consistent S-expansion of A if and only if 
T is a consistent I-expansion of A, then we can say, that different monotonic modal 
logics, S and 7, determine the same nonmonotonic modal logic, or that “nonmonotonic 
S coincides with nonmonotonic 7”. Clearly, if S C 7 C S5, and S and 7 determine 
the same nonmonotonic logic, then each logic between S and 7 determines the ‘same 
nonmonotonic logic. A range ofS is the collection of all modal logics which determine 
the same nonmonotonic logic as S does. 
We will need in the next section the semantic characterization of S-expansions given 
in [ 261, so called minimal model semantics. 
A nonempty set N C M is called a final cone of the model M = (M, R, V) if: 
(i) N is a cone, that is, for each cy E N, for each p, CYRP implies /3 E N; 
(ii) N is final, that is, for each (Y E M, for each p E N, (YRP. 
It follows from (ii), that a final cone is necessarily a cluster (because N C M), so 
we will call a final cone also a jinal cluster. Also, a Kripke model can have only one 
final cluster (assume N, K are two final clusters of M; let LY E N, ,8 E K; from (ii) 
for K we have aR/3, from (i) for N, we get /3 E N). A model N = (N, R’, V’), where 
R* and V* are the restrictions on N of R and V, respectively, is called a final cluster 
model of M. We will sometimes write “final cluster” for denoting a final cluster model. 
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No ambiguity will appear. 
The final cluster (and the corresponding cluster model) is proper if there is some 
LY E M\ N for each /3 E N there is a propositional variable p such that V,(p) # V,(p). 
Let M = (M, R, V) and N = (N, Q, W) be two Kripke models. We say, that M is 
preferred over N if N is a proper final cluster model of M. We write M c N to 
denote that M is preferred over N. Clearly, if M c N, then N is necessarily an 
SS-model. 
The following obvious proposition explains why we need to distinguish proper final 
clusters. 
Proposition 2.2. Assume that M is a final cluster of N, but not a proper final cluster 
of N. Then for each modal formula p, M b sp if and only if N 1 cp. 
If we interpret the knowledge (or belief) set of an agent as the set of sentences true 
in each world of a model, then M c N implies that the knowledge set with respect 
to M is included in the one with respect to N. Thus, intuitively, we prefer models of 
agent’s knowledge, in which the agent knows less. If A is the initial knowledge set of 
an agent, we look for a minimal model according to our preference relation, where the 
agent still knows A. These informal considerations are formalized as follows. 
If A is a set of formulas, then, as usual, a model for A is a Kripke model in any 
world of which all formulas of A are true. Let K be a class of Kripke models. Let M 
be an SS-model in K, i.e. a model with the universal accessibility relation. We say, that 
M is a K-minimal model for A, if M is a model for A, and there is no N E K such 
that N is a model for A and N c M. 
If S is any of the logics KD45, SW5, S4F, S4 or S4.2, by an S-minimal model 
we mean a K-minimal model, where K is a class of all S-models. (So it is clear that 
S4-minimal models and S4.2-minimal models coincide). 
Analogous notions may be introduced for other modal logics which have good Kripke 
characterizations. 
Let M = (M, R, V) be a Kripke model, let MO c M be its final cluster. Let N = (N, U) 
be a cluster. By the cluster substitution of N in M we mean the model ((M \ Ma) U 
N, Q, W), where for each IX, p E (M \ MO) U N, aQ/3 if and only if aRp or p E N, W 
agrees with V on M \ MO, and agrees with U on N. (In other words, we substitute the 
cluster N in place of MO into M.) 
Let K be a class of models. We say that K is cluster closed if K contains all 
clusters and for each M E K, at least one of the following two conditions holds: the 
concatenation of M and each cluster belongs to K, or M has the final cluster and for 
each cluster N, the cluster substitution of N in M belongs to K. 
Theorem 2.3. Let a normal modal logic S be contained in S5 and be characterized 
by a cluster closed class of models K. Let T be any consistent stable set of formulas, 
Mr be a canonical SS-model of A. Then the following three conditions are equivalent: 
( 1) T is an S-expansion of A; 
(2) MT is an S-minimal model for A; 
(3) for some SS-model M, T = {$: M k (cl} and M is S-minimal for A. 
Clearly, Theorem 2.3 applies to logics S4, S4.2, S4F, S4.4, KD4.5, S5, S4.3 and many 
others. 
McDermott [ 191 proved that for each logic S containing the necessitation rule all S- 
expansions are closed under S5. We believe that this, along with the intuition, is a clear 
indication that only logics contained in S5 can be a reasonable basis for nonmonotonic 
reasoning, and consider only logics contained in S5. However, for a formally oriented 
reader, we can prove the following simple proposition asserting that a logic not contained 
in S5 (but containing the necessitation rule) can never be in one range with any logic 
contained in S5. 
Proposition 2.4. Let S be any logic contuined in S5, and 7 be any logic not contained 
in S5. Then there exists u consistent S-expansion of the empty theory which is not a 
I-expansion of (il. 
Proof. All I-expansions are closed both under 7 and S5, hence they arc closed under 
the logic C which contains all the schemas of S and 7. C is a proper extension of S5. 
Segerberg [ 291 gave a complete description of all extensions of S5. Each such extension 
is a logic S,, which is determined by the class of all SS-models containing no more than 
II worlds, for some finite 72. Thus, for some II, C is S,,. But St(g) is an S-expansion of 0 
[ 301. Let PI, , p,, be pairwise different propositional variables. Then St( 8) contains 
all the formulas M(pl A p;_i A m’p, A pl+ 1 A A p,) for each i, 0 < i < n. But the 
conjunction of all these formulas is refutable in S,,, hence St(@) cannot be closed under 
S,,. n 
Remark 2.5. We defined two logics to be “undistinguishable”, if they have the same 
consistent expansions. What if we take inconsistent expansions into account, too? Mc- 
Dermott [ 191 noticed that if A has an inconsistent S-expansion then it is the only 
S-expansion of A, and A is inconsistent with S (that is, A FS false). Hence if S C 7 
and S and 7 are in the same range, then the only possibility for 7 and S to have 
different expansions is if some A has no S-expansions, and the only I-expansion is in- 
consistent. Because the absence of expansions and the presence of the only inconsistent 
expansion are usually understood in nonmonotonic logic as nonmonotonic inconsistency, 
we can still consider S and 7 as nonmonotonically indistinguishable. But if we consider 
logics containing S4, then such subtleties are inessential at all. It is well known that 
a theory is consistent with S4 iff it is consistent with S5. Hence for logics contain- 
ing S4 all our results concerning consistent expansions hold for arbitrary expansions 
too. 
3. Maximality property of KD45, SW5 and S4F 
We proved in 1271 that the empty theory has only one KD45-expansion, and only one 
SWS-expansion, but for each extension S of KD45 or SW5, contained in S5, the empty 
theory has at least two S-expansions. Similarly, for each logic S containing S4F and 
contained in S5, there is a theory I such that I has no nested modalities and no positive 
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occurrences of L, and there is an S-expansion of I, which is not an S4F-expansion of 
I [28]. It follows from these results that KD45, SW5 and S4F are maximal in their 
ranges. However results of [28] do not imply that, say, S4F is the largest logic in 
its range: they do not exclude the possibility of the existence of a logic incomparable 
with S4F, whose expansions coincide with S4F-expansions. The situation for KD45 or 
SW5 is the same. Moreover, methods of [27,28] cannot give the stronger result that 
the logics are largest in their ranges: we used the complete description of all extensions 
of S4F (or KD45) given by Segerberg in [29], and no effective description of all the 
logics incomparable with S4F (or KD45) is known by now. 
Below we prove that KD45, SW5 and S4F are largest in their ranges. That means, for 
example, that each logic whose expansions coincide with S4F-expansions, is contained 
in S4F. 
Theorem 3.1. Let S be any logic contained in S5 and not contained in KD45. Then 
there exists a theory I such that some S-expansion of I is not a KD45expansion of I. 
Proof. Presented in Appendix A. 0 
Corollary 3.2. Zf S is any logic in the same range as KD45, then each theorem of S is 
a theorem of KD45. 
Theorem 3.3. Let S be any logic contained in S5 and not contained in SW5. Then 
there exists a theory I such that some S-expansion of I is not an SWS-expansion of I. 
Proof. See Appendix A. 0 
Corollary 3.4. If S is any logic in the same range as SW5, then each theorem of S is 
a theorem of SW5. 
Theorem 3.5. Let S be any logic contained in S5 and not contained in S4F. Then 
there exists a theory I such that some S-expansion of I is not an S4F-expansion of I. 
Proof. See Appendix A. q 
Corollary 3.6. If S is any logic in the same range as S4F, then each theorem of S is 
a theorem of S4F. 
The depth of a Kripke model (M, R, V) with the transitive accessibility relation is the 
largest number k such that there exists a sequence of worlds of the length k, WI,. . . , Wk 
such that for each 1 < i < k, wiRwt+l, and not Wi+t Rwi. Logic S has depth k, if 
each underivable formula of S can be refuted on a Kripke model of depth k, and some 
theorem I of S can be refuted on a Kripke model of depth k + 1. For instance, S5 is 
of finite depth 1; SW5 and S4F are of depth 2. Logic of finite depth is a logic which 
contains K4 and has depth k for some natural number k. Logics S4, S4.2 and S4.3 
are of infinite depth. We show in Appendix B that all logics of finite depth which are 
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contained in S4F are in the range of S4F. We also present for each k a (well-known) 
logic of depth k, so the range of S4F is quite large. 
4. The range of S4 
It is clear that if M ä N. and M is an S4-model, then M is also an S4.2-model, 
hence consistent S4-expansions and S4.2-expansions coincide. However, this fact is quite 
simple and can be established without any knowledge of minimal model semantics. 
Moreover, the scheme 2 always leaves a logic in the same range. 
Proposition 4.1. Let S be uq modul logic contained in S5. Then the logic I obtained 
by e.xtending S with the schemu 2 is in the same range as S. 
Proof. It is sufficient to show that each consistent I-expansion of A is also an S- 
expansion of A. Assume T = Cn7(A !? .I~@: @ $! T). Because S i T, Ctzs(A U 
{-L$: $ $! T}) C T. Thus, it remains to prove that each p E T is derivable in S from 
Au{-L$: 9 $T}. F or, it suffices to prove that each instance of schema 2 is derivable 
in S from {+/J: $ 6 T}. Let ~LlLqc X, L-lL~qc be such an instance. If 40 +! T, 
then, using the necessitation rule, we have L-T& t Cns( {?L$: $ 6 T}), hence, by 
propositional logic, we have >Lm;Lq > L-Ly E Crls(A U {1Lt,b: (I $! T}). 
Assume now that p t T. Then ~rp $ T. and again, using necessitation and proposi- 
tional logic we obtain ~LlLqo > Ll.Llq E Cns (A U {-LA): qb $! T}). 0 
Thus, S4.2 and S4 are in the same range. We prove that S4.2 is the largest logic in 
this range. The basic idea is the same as for S4E but it requires essential modification: 
if we try to repeat the construction of the proof of Theorem 3.5, we will fail, because 
for general S4.2-models we will not have /?Qa,, for each j3 not in the final cluster of P, 
like we did for S4F-models. Moreover. it was proved in [ 161 that for all finite theories 
I, S4F-expansions and S4-expansions of I are the same. Thus, the theory I having an 
S-expansion which is not an S4.2-expansion, must necessarily be infinite. We achieve 
the goal carefully splitting the formula LF --) (C A r) of the proof of Theorem 3.5 into 
infinitely many formulas. 
Theorem 4.2. Let S be any mod& logic which is contuined in S5, but does not contain 
S4.2. Then there exists a theory A such that A has u consistent S-expansion which is 
not an S4.2.expansion. 
Proof. See Appendix A. U 
Corollary 4.3. Logic S4.2 is largest in the runge of S4. 
The proof of Theorem 4.2 was constructive enough, so for a logic not contained 
in S4.2 we can construct an infinite theory which will distinguish the corresponding 
nonmonotonic logics. We give an example of applying this technique to show that non- 
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monotonic logic S4.3 differs from nonmonotonic S4.2 (and, hence, from nonmonotonic 
S4). S4.3 is very popular and serves as a basis for tense logics (the accessibility relation 
r is interpreted as “always in the future”). But it appears that S4.3 is also relevant to 
knowledge representation, and to nonmonotonic logics: Craig Boutilier [l] used S4.3- 
models as a basis for his proposal of a generalization of the autoepistemic logic so 
that it be possible to introduce gradation of belief. Thus, it might be worthy to locate 
correctly nonmonotonic S4.3. 
Example 4.4. Consider an instance of the axiom of S4.3, F = L(Lp 3 q)) V L(Lq 3 
p), where p and q are different atoms. Consider the following Kripke model: M = 
(M, R, V), where: 
. M={O,P,QJ>; 
l ~RPiff~=Oorp=l; 
l p is true in P and 1, and is false in Q and 0; q is true in Q and 1, and is false in 
P and 0. 
Thus, { 1) is a final cluster, and M is an S4.2-model. Clearly, F(p,q) is false in 0, 
so we can use F to obtain a theory having an S4.3-expansion which is not an S4.2- 
expansion, as we did in the proof of Theorem 4.2. In our case K = {l}, so formula 
C (p, q) is just one disjunct, namely, C(p, q) = p A q. Let pt , ~2, . . . and 41, q2, . . . be 
infinite lists of different variables, r be different from all pi and qi. From the proof of 
Theorem 4.2, we obtain the following theory A having an S4.3-expansion which is not 
an S4.2-expansion: 
A={(L(LPI >qi)VL(Lqt 2~1)) >r> 
u lJ{L(WR,., 3 qnr+1 ) VL(@,,I 3Pm+l)) 3 bnbn))l<n~<co. 
Remark 4.5. In [ 161 an example of a theory having an S4F-expansion, but having no 
S4-expansions, was constructed; in fact, the (infinite) theory constructed there has no 
S4.3-expansions, which is easy to cheek. So nonmonotonic S4.3 lies strictly between 
nonmonotonic S4.2 and S4.F. Note that for finite theories all three logics coincide. 
5. Discussion. The paradigm of maximal logics 
There are infinitely many modal logics, but only few of them are considered as 
reasonable logics of knowledge and belief. Usually, arguments in favor of any particular 
logic consist in philosophical speculations about intuitive meaning of particular axioms. 
While intuitive considerations are important, we feel that it would be nice, to augment 
intuitions by exact mathematical results. A drawback of intuitive considerations based on 
axiomatizations of logics is the following. They usually give reasonable answers on the 
question “why these axioms?’ by providing arguments, why axioms of a given system 
are intuitively acceptable. But they fail to provide a reasonable argument to the question, 
“why not more?‘. For instance, a typical argument in favor of the point that S4 is “the” 
logic of knowledge, is the following. All the modal axioms of S4 appear to be natural 
if we interpret the modality L as “is known”. An SS-axiom ~Lrp > LlLp (negative 
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introspection) does not correspond to the intuition (an agent can be convinced that p 
holds when q is in fact false; so s/he does not know 9, although is not aware of this). 
Thus, S4 is the logic of knowledge. 
But there are infinitely many normal modal logics between S4 and S5! In fact, from 
a result of Jankov [Y] it follows that the set of logics between S4 and S5 has the 
cardinality of the continuum. So how we can be sure that there is no logic between S4 
and SS satisfying our intuitions? 
We suggest the following approach to the problem. Consider some property, P, ot 
modal logics such that: 
l P is “natural” for a suggested interpretation of the modal operator, or is otherwise 
desirable; 
l P is stable with respect to intervals of logics: if St and S2 are two logics both 
possessing the property ‘P, then any logic between St and S2 also has the property 
P. 
Then. if we find a logic S which is otherwise acceptable, has the property P and is 
maximal with respect to P, then we have a strong, and not an ad hoc style, argument 
that we have put as much as we could in S: nothing can be added to S. If, in addition, 
we can prove that S is the largest logic with the property P, then we are even better 
off: S has no potential competitor for its role. 
Of course, the above scheme may be applicable not only to logics of knowledge and 
belief, but in any situation, when we are in search for a “true” logic for any application. 
There has been a reasonable argument that logics of knowledge and belief are non- 
monotonic logics, and we focus our investigation on one of the most known and mostly 
advanced approaches to nonmonotonic modal logics, namely McDermott and Doyle’s 
approach, which emphasizes the self-referential character of epistemic reasoning. This 
approach is convenient to such investigations when we are interested in properties of 
a logic as a member of a family of all possible logics. The reason is that this ap- 
proach is technically very uniform: It assigns to each possible monotonic modal logic 
the corresponding nonmonotonic logic. 
Several results has been previously obtained in this direction. 
In [ 251 we proved that logics KD45 and SW5 are maximal logics S with the property 
that each objective theory has only one S-expansion. This is a very natural property: 
it states that if our axioms do not say anything about knowledge, then the behavior of 
expansions should be the same as that of the usual monotonic consequence. 
In [28] we proved that S4F is maximal with respect to the following property: if 
A consists only of formulas without nested modalities, and all the occurrences of L 
in A are negative, then A has only one S-expansion T, and the objective part of T is 
the objective part of the deductive closure of A. This is a very important and desirable 
property: roughly, it says that nonmonotonic S does not admit so-called ungrounded 
expansions, like an expansion St(/>) of the theory Lp > p in Moore’s autoepistemic 
logic. 
It follows from the above results that logics KD4.5, SW5 and S4F are maximal in 
their ranges. In the present paper we strengthened this result by proving that these logics 
are also largest in their ranges. This is only a partial success in the direction we outlined 
above: It would be interesting to show that they are largest not just in their ranges, 
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but largest with respect to properties of the two previous paragraphs. We presented 
a technique for proving maximality results based on the minimal model semantics of 
nonmonotonic modal logics we developed earlier in [ 261, which is a significant advance 
in comparison with the technique used in [25,28]: although the results there looked 
general as they referred to all the logic containing, say, S4F (which are infinitely 
many), the proofs had a very ad hoc character, as they used the complete description of 
all extensions of logics in question. 
The central technical result of the paper is that S4 is not a maximal logic in its range, 
but the logic S4.2 is. This is a formal support to an argument that S4.2 should replace 
S4 as a candidate for “the” logic of knowledge, a point expressed earlier in [ 131 based 
on purely philosophical considerations. 
In view of our general program, it would be interesting to find a general property 
for which S4.2 would be maximal. Because for finite theories S4.2-expansions coincide 
with S4F-expansions, such a property must necessarily involve infinite theories. 
Another open technical question we can suggest is the following. Our example of 
an infinite theory A which has an S4F-expansion, but has no S6expansions involves 
infinitely many propositional variables. We know that for finite theories S4F-expansions 
coincide with S4-expansions. But can we give such an example involving only finitely 
many propositional variables? 
Finally, we would like to pose a problem concerning S4F which, although it lies be- 
yond our outlined program of investigating ranges and maximal properties, is of impor- 
tance for knowledge representation as part of general program of exhibiting reasonable 
epistemic logics. 
Previous research, including the present paper, suggest that the following logics are of 
particular interest: S.5, KD45, SW5 S4F and S4.2. Among these logics, S4F is the only 
one whose axioms do not look very natural under the epistemological understanding of 
modality: we cannot provide a reasonable argument in favor of the axiom F. On the other 
hand, recent work shows that nonmonotonic S4F is a truly remarkable logic (see [28] 
for a detailed investigation of that logic). It generalizes Moore’s autoepistemic logic, 
default logic, Lin and Shoham’s and Lifschitz’s versions of logics for grounded (or 
minimal) knowledge. In many respects it is more natural then Moore’s autoepistemic 
logic, or reflexive autoepistemic logic introduced in [ 251. 
Logics KD45 and SW5 have an important advantage over other modal logics: the 
corresponding nonmonotonic logics admit description in purely propositional terms, 
without referring to any particular modal logics. Nonmonotonic KD45 coincides with 
Moore’s autoepistemic logic (see [ 25]), and nonmonotonic SW5 coincides with the 
reflexive autoepistemic logic introduced in [25]. A theory T is a consistent KD45- 
expansion of A if and only if 
T = Cn(A U {+k I/ 6 T} u {Lt+k (Ir E T}), 
where Cn denotes usual propositional closure. Similarly, consistent SWS-expansions are 
described as solutions to the fixed point equation 
T = Cn(A u {+,k t+b $ T} U {I!# = @: $ E T}). 
It would be interesting to get a similar “purely propositional” description for the non- 
monotonic S4F. Or to prove that such a description is impossible (this would require also 
an appropriate formal definition of what a “propositional description” is). In fact, recent 
work of Gottlob [ 41, who proved that in some precise sense, a syntactical translation 
of Reiter’s default logic into Moore’s autoepistemic logic is impossible, suggests that it 
is very likely that a nice propositional description of nonmonotonic S4F is impossible. 
Concluding, we would like to express the hope that the idea of maximal logics can 
find applications outside the McDermott-Doyle scheme. Our goal, besides presenting 
some new results on nonmonotonic logics, was to show how such a paradigm can work. 
Appendix A. Proofs 
Theorem 3.1. Let S be unp logic, contuirled in S5 and not contained in KD45. Then 
there exists u theoq I such that some S-e.xpansion of I is not a KD45-expansion of I. 
Proof. Since S is not contained in KD45, there is a formula which is a theorem of S but 
not a theorem of KD45. Let F = F(pl , , p,,) be such formula and let p,, . ,p,, be 
the complete list of its propositional variables. By the completeness theorem for KD45, 
there is a finite KD45-model M = ({a~} u M, R, V) with the upper cluster M, such that 
M p F. Because F is a theorem of S5, F is true in all the worlds in M, hence (~0 $ M 
and CM,cuo) pF(p~,...,p,,). 
Now let M = {PI,. . , /3k}. F or each fl t M. by pfi we will denote the variable 
p. if ,V is true in the world ,6?, and its negation up, if p is false in /?, By Pp we 
denote the conjunction plB A A ~7~0. Finally, let C = C(pl, . . ,pn) be a disjunction 
PpI V V Pp.. Let I be a propositional letter different from all the pi’s. Finally, we put 
/={F(p ,,.... p,,) II) CC(p I..... pn) Ar)}. 
We shall prove that I satisfies the conclusion of the theorem, that is, there is an S- 
expansion of I, which is not a KD45-expansion of 1. 
First, since F is a theorem of S, I is equivalent in S to an objective theory C A r. 
Therefore, according to a result of [ 301, the theory T = St( C A r) is an S-expansion of 
I. Let N = (N, W) be the canonical SS-model for C A r. We show that N is a model of 
I, which is not KD45-minimal. Hence, the desired conclusion will follow by Theorem 
2.3. 
Formula C A r is true in A’, hence I is true, too. Now it remains to construct a 
KD45-model P such that P c N. and P /= 1. 
Clearly N consists of all the worlds where r is true and one of Pp for some /? E M 
is true. Let us denote by Np, for fl E M, the set of all worlds in N where Pp is true. 
Clearly, each Np is nonempty, and N = U{ Np: p E M}. 
Consider now the KD45-model P = ({LUG} ii N, Q, Or), where Q = ({a~} u N) x N, 
U coincides with W on N, and put r/,,, (y,) = V,,, (pi), Uan, (r) = false. We claim that 
for each formula cp containing only variables ~1,. . ,pn the following hold: 
l foreach Pt M, foreachyE Np, (M,/3) kpifandonlyif (P,y) kp; 
l (M,q) kcp if and only if (‘P,,(j) k rp. 
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We prove these claims by induction on 9. The induction basis follows immediately 
from the definition of P. The only nontrivial case in the induction step is if q = v. 
Assume that /3 E M, y E Np, (M,P) k L$. Then for each 77 E M, (M,v) + #. 
Hence, by the induction hypothesis, for each 7 E M, for each 6 E NV, we have 
(P, S) b 9. Because each S E N belongs to some N,, we have for each 6 E N, 
(P. 8) + $, hence (P, y) I= W. 
Conversely, assume that y E Np, (M, /3) k Le. Consider an arbitrary 6 E M. 
Because Ns is nonempty, we have some v E Na. We have rQ7, hence (P, 7) k $. By 
the induction hypothesis we have (M, 8) + q. Because S was arbitrary in M, we have 
(M,p) t=L$-. 
Assume now that (M, a~) b L$. Then for each p E M, (M, /I) b $. Repeating our 
above considerations, we obtain that for each y E N, (P, y) b @, hence (P, ao) b L$. 
Conversely, if (P, LYO) t= Lt,k, then for each 6 E N, (P, 8) b r,~+. Again, repeating the 
considerations we presented for the first clause, we get for each p E M, (M, p) I$, 
hence (M, cq) + L$. Thus, our claim is proved. 
Because F contains no propositional letters other then pt , . . . , pn, we have 
(P,,o) I+ F. (A.1) 
Hence we have (P, au) \ F 3 (C A r). Also, P c JV, because I is true everywhere 
in n/, and is false in q. Thus, JV is a model of I which is not KD45-minimal, therefore, 
T = Th(N) is not a KD45-expansion of {F > (C A r)}. Cl 
Theorem 3.3. Let S be any logic contained in S5 and not contained in SW5. Then 
there exists a theory I such that some S-expansion of I is not an SWS-expansion of I. 
Proof. The proof is the same as that of Theorem 3.1. The only difference is that as F we 
should take a formula derivable in S but not in SW5, and as a model-an SWS-model 
falsifying F. 0 
Theorem 3.5. Let S be any logic contained in S5 and not contained in S4F. Then there 
exists a theory I such that some S-expansion of I is not an S4F-expansion of I. 
Proof. Here we need a small modification to the proof of Theorem 3.1. Since S is not 
contained in S4F, there is a formula which is a theorem of S but not a theorem of S4F. 
Let F be such formula and ~1,. . . , p,, the complete list of its propositional variables. 
By the completeness theorem for S4F, there is a finite S4F-model M = (M, R, V) and 
a world (~0 E M such that (M,ao) F F(p~,...,p~). Let MO and Ml be the lower and 
upper clusters of M, respectively. That is, M = MO U Ml, MO and Ml are disjoint, and 
foreachcuand/3,crRPiffrwEMuorpEMr. 
Because S is contained in S5, we have (M, p) k F for each /3 E Ml. Hence 
q E MO. 
Nowlet Ml ={/?I,.. . , Pk}. We define formula C = C (~1, . . . , p, ) exactly as we did 
in the proof of Theorem 3.1, using Ml in place of M. Let r be a propositional letter 
different from all the pi’s. We put: 
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(Note that we would fail if we took the formula F > (C Ar) like we did in two previous 
theorems, because then we would bc unable to prove the truth of I in the worlds of the 
lower cluster, different from LYO. ) 
WC shall prove that I satisfies the conclusion of the theorem, that is there is an 
S-expansion of I, which is not an S4F-expansion of I. First, since F is a theorem of 
S, I is equivalent in S to an objective theory C A r. Therefore, according to a result of 
[30], the theory T = St(C A r) is an S-expansion of 1. We will prove that T is not an 
S4F-expansion of I by using Theorem 2.3. 
Let N = (N, W) be a canonical %-model for C A r. Let P = (MO U N, Q, U) be 
a Kripke model such that czQp iff a E MO or p E N, U coincides with W on M, 
Up(pi) = V,(pi), and U,,,(r) = ,fhlse. Like in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we can show 
that for each formula 40 consisting of variables PI.. . ,p,, only, for each LY E MO, 
(.A4, au) k (o if and only if (P. a) k p. Hence we obtain that (P, q) b -F, and, 
since for each /3 E MO. /~Q(Yo, we have for each p E MO, (P,p> k lLF, hence 
(P,/?) k LF > (C A r). And because we have N 1 C A r, we obtain P 1 I. 
Also. N is a final cluster of P, and, since Y is true in N and false in cy,, E MO, N 
is a proper final cluster of P. Thus, N is a model of I which is not an S4F-minimal 
model of I, hence T = Th( N) is not an S4F-expansion of 1. 0 
Theorem 4.2. Let S be an! modul logic which is contained in S5, but does not contain 
S4.2. Then there exists a theoy A .ruch that A has a consistent S-expansion which is 
Yzot art S4.2-expansion. 
Proof. Assume that there is a formula F = F( ~1,. , p,,) which is a theorem of S, 
but not a theorem of S4.2. Then there exists a finite S4.2-model M = (M, R, V) and 
a0 E M such that (M, q) p F(p1. ,pII ). Because M is finite and directed, M has 
a final cluster. Let K be a final cluster of .M, P = M \ K. That means that M is a 
disjoint union of K and P, for each cy E M. for each p E K, aRP, and for each p E K, 
for each y E M, PRy implies y t K. 
Clearly, (~0 $! K. (Because F is a theorem of S5, we have p k F for each /? E K.) 
Let K = {PI,. . , &}. For each j, I < ,j < k, and for each p E K, let F’i’ be pi, if 
(M, p) b pi, and let E’;p be 7p.i otherwise. Let Pfl be a conjunction P,fl A A P,,p. 
By C=C(pl,... , pn ) we denote the disjunction of all formulas Pp for all p E K. 
Now we are in a position to give an example of a theory A. Let {Pj’}l<j<n,l</<a be 
pairwise distinct propositional letters, let r be different from all pi’. Let A be an infinite 
theory, consisting of the formula F(pl’ , ,p,,‘) > r, and of all the formulas 
LF(p?‘+ ,..., p,,“‘+‘) I C(p,“‘,. ...p,l”‘). 
for all 112 3 I. 
We assume that there are countably many propositional variables in our language. 
Therefore, we can assume, without loss of generality, that the p: and r are all the 
variables of the language. 
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We claim that A satisfies the desired properties. First, by the definition of a logic, 
the set of theorems of S is closed under substitutions for variables, and we consider 
only logics containing the necessitation rule. Hence, all the formulas LF(ptm, . . . ,p,,“) 
are theorems of S. Hence, in S, A is equivalent to the objective theory 0 consisting of 
r and all the formulas C (pt ,x, . . . , p,” ) , m 2 1. Hence, T = St( 0) is an S-expansion 
of A. We will prove that T is not an S4.2-expansion of A, using the minimal model 
semantics. 
Let N = (N, W) be a canonical .%-model for 0 (that means, in particular, that 
T = T/t(N) ). Each world cr of N has the following property: for each natural number 
m, there exists & E M, such that for each j, 1 6 j 6 n, W,(pj”) = Vpn(pj) 
(this property is implied by the fact that the formula C (pt “‘, . . . ,p,,“> is true in N) . 
Conversely, because N consists of all the worlds where all formulas of 0 are true, for 
each sequence of worlds of M, {p,},, there exists a world LY E N such that for each 
j, 1 6 j 6 n, 
Wa(Pj"'> = bn,(Pj). (A.2) 
Because I is true in all the worlds of N, and all the propositional variables of our 
language are p/’ and r, we can, without loss of generality, assume that N consists of all 
the infinite sequences CY = {&,,}, of worlds of M, and the valuation W is determined 
by (A.2) for pj”‘, and W,(r) is true for each (Y E N. 
In other words, (Y treats pj”’ like the mth component of LY treats pi. 
Because each member of A is an implication whose successor is in 0, and N is a 
model of 0. we have 
N +A. (A.3) 
Thus, we have that N is an S-5model of A, and T is the theory of N. To complete 
the proof that T is not an S4.2-expansion of A, it remains to show that N is not 
S4.Zminimal for A, that is, to construct an S4.2-model P such that P + A and P c N. 
We construct the model P = (B,Q, U) as follows. First, remember that our initial 
model M consists of two parts: the final cluster K and the rest P. For each natural 
number m, let P,,, denote the set {m} x P. Thus, the P,,, are disjoint copies of P. Let 
B be the disjoint union of N and all P,,,, m = 1,2,. . . . Now, define the accessibility 
relation Q as follows. Put rQP for all p E N, y E B. For p, y E P, put (m, p)Q(n, y) 
if and only if m < n or (m = n and PRy). 
In other worlds, N is the final cluster of P, and we put the infinite sequence {Pi}, 
of copies of P, “converging” to the final cluster N. Now, define the valuation U. For 
p E N, we put Up to coincide with Wp. 
Let us fix an arbitrary PO E K. Let a = (m, /I). We define U, (pi”) = V’(pi), and 
for all I f m, we define U,(pi’) = Vb(pi). Finally, we put W(l,,,) (r) = false, and 
Wp( r) = true for all /3 different from (1, a~). 
A formula r is false in (1, a)~) and true everywhere in N. Therefore, N is a proper 
final cluster of P. Hence, to complete the proof of the theorem, it remains to prove that 
P FA. 
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Claim A.l. Let q(pl , , p,, ) be any jtirmula constructed from variables ~1, , p,,. 
Then: 
(i) For each cy = {a,}, t N, ,for each m. P, cy k qo(pl “I, . . . , p,,“‘) if and only if 
(M,%,) ~~(PI~~~..P,I)~ 
(ii) for each m. for each 1 > M. for each y t PI, (P,y) k q(p~“‘, . . ,p,,“‘) if and 
or&-if (M,Po) /=dp~,...,pn). 
(iii) For each m, for each y E P, (P.(m,y)) k q~(pk~*,.. .,p,,“‘) if and only if 
(M,r) t=dp~,...>p,,). 
Proof. All the items are proved by induction on the complexity of 9. 
(i) The induction basis follows immediately from the definition of the model P. The 
only nontrivial case in the induction step is if 9 is L$(pl “I,. . , p,“‘). Assume (P, (w) k 
L$(p,“‘, . . , p,,“‘). Then for each /3 t M, for the world y = {Y~,}~! such that for each 
Fn 7’~ = p. we have (P, y) b $(p~ ‘I’. , p,,“’ ) Hence, by the induction hypothesis, we 
have foreach PE M, (M,P) k@(p) . . . . . p,?), hence (M,cu,,) kL$(p~ . . . . . pn). 
Conversely, assume (M. a,,,) b L$(pl . . p,,). Then for each y t M. (M, y) k 
@(p, , , p,,). But for each /I E N there is some y t M such that Pnr = y, hence, ap- 
plying the induction hypothesis, we obtain for each p E N, (P, /3) b $(pl ‘I,. . ,p,“‘), 
hence (P,(w) /= L@(PI”‘, ,p,,“‘). 
(ii) The induction basis follows from the definition (for all 1 # m, values of pin’ in 
all the worlds of Pi coincide with values of p, in PO). In the induction step the only 
nontrivial case is if the main logical symbol of cp is L. 
Assume (P,y) b Ly?(pl”‘.... .p,,“‘). Then we have for each cr E N (P,,) k 
*([q”‘. ,p,,“‘), hence by (i). Ibr each cy c M, (M,a) k $(pl ,. .p,,), hence 
(M,Po) ~=W(PI....,P,,). 
Conversely, assume (M, PO) k L$(pi. .I),,). y E P,, 1 > m. Assume yQ6. Then 
either 6 t N, or 6 t F’, for some j 3 1. In the former case by (i), and in the 
latter case by the induction hypothesis we obtain (P, S) k @(pl m,. . . , p,“‘), hence 
(P,y) + L@(pln’, ,p,,“‘). 
(iii) Again the induction basis follows from the definition, and the only nontrivial 
case is if q~ begins with L. 
Assume (P, (m, y)) k L$(pl”‘. ,P,~“‘) and prove (M,r) k W(PI,...,P,). 
Assume yR6. Either 6 t N, or 6 E P (in which case also (m, y)Q(m, 6)). In the former 
case by (i), and in the latter case by the induction hypothesis we have (M, 6) k 
ccl(p~ . . . . ,P,~), hence (M,y) ~=W(PI.....P,,). 
Conversely, assume (M, y) k L@(pl , .p,,), y E P. Let (m, y)Qs. Then one of 
three cases is possible: 
(I) 6~ N; 
(2) for some 1 3 m, 6 E 4: 
(3) for some 71 E P such that yR7, 6 = (m, 7). 
If ( I) holds, we obtain (P, 6) 1 @(pin’. . . ,p,“‘) from (i). Assume that (2) 
holds. We have yR& hence (M,Po) k fi(pl,..., p,), hence by (ii), (?,a) k 
lcI(pl’l’, . ,p,“‘). If (3) holds, then we have (P, 6) b #(pt”‘, . . . ,p,“‘) by the induc- 
tion hypothesis. Thus, we obtain (P, y) k L$(pl”, , p,“). 0 
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Proof of Theorem 4.2 (Continued). From the claim we conclude that, for each m, 
(P, (m,ao)) k+h”,. . . ,pn”>. (A.41 
Now we show that for each world LY of P, (P, cy) k A. 
Consider all the members of A. Because in all the worlds p different from (1, a~), 
r is true, we have also F(pi’, . . ,p,,‘) > r is true in all these worlds. On the other 
hand, according to (A.4), F(pi’,. . .,p,‘> is false in (1,cro) . Thus we have P b 
F(pl’, . . . ,p,‘) 3 r. 
All the other members of A are of the form 
LF(py’+‘, .. . ,pnn’+‘) 3 C(Pl”‘, . . . ,p,“). 
Let us denote this formula by p,,,. If (Y E N, then the successor of pm is true in 
(Y, hence q,,, is true in (Y. If LY E Pk where k > m, then again, according to (ii) 
of the claim, (P, a) k C(pim,. . . ,pnm), hence (P, cr) + (Do. Assume that cr E Pk, 
where k < m. Then we have aQ((m+ l),cuc), and, by (A.4), (P,((m+ l),aa)) k 
+(pi”‘+l,. . . ,pp+l ). Hence (P, a) + lLF(ptm+‘, . . . ,pnmf’), hence (P, a) 1 ppnt. 
Thus, we have P k A, and, because P is an S4.2-model, N is not an S4.2-minimal 
model of A. 0 
Appendix B. Between S4.2 and SW5 
In this section we take a closer look at the segment [ S4.2, SW51 . In particular, we 
show that S4.3 is the largest logic in its range. Also we present infinitely many different 
logics between S4.2 and S4.4 which are largest in their ranges (and therefore, different). 
All these logics belong to the family of so-called logics of finite width. 
As for the segment [S4.3, S4F], the situation remains unclear. We show that all 
logics of finite depth contained in S4F are in the same range as S4F. However, there are 
infinitely, many logics of infinite depth between S4.3 and S4F. We do not know by now 
if they are nonmonotonically different, or coincide with S4F, or whatever. But because 
all the extensions of S4.3 are effectively described by Kit Fine [2], we hope that these 
questions should not be too difficult. 
Careful examination of the proof of Theorem 4.2 allows us to separate the properties 
of a logic and its characterizing class of Kripke frames which are really used in the proof. 
We will list these properties and exhibit infinitely many logics with these properties. 
First, let us introduce some notation. Assume that 3 = (M, R) is a Kripke frame, 
and K be the final cluster of F. By 3- we will denote the result of removing F 
from F _? = (M \ K, R \ M x K) . By 3* we denote the frame which is a result of 
concatenating infinitely many copies of 3. Formally, let w be the set of natural numbers. 
Then 3* = (w x M, Q), where (m, a)Q(n, p) if and only if m < n or m = n and aR/l. 
By TX7 we denote the concatenation of frames 3 and Q. 
Now, it is easy to formulate conditions on logic S which were really used in the 
proof of Theorem 4.2. 
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Theorem B.l. Assume that S is u logic contained in S5, and C and 2) are classes of 
frames. Assume that the following hold: 
l all frames from C and D are transitive, reflexive and have a final cluster,. 
l V is a class of finite frames: 
l S is determined by V; 
l S is cluster closed: 
l S is characterized by C; 
l for each 3 E ‘D, and for each cluster K, (3~- ) *^K E C. 
Then for each logic I which is contained in S5 but not contained in S, there is a 
theory I such that some I-expansion of I is not an S-expansion of I. 
Proof. Careful examination of the proof of Theorem 4.2 shows that, in fact, this, more 
general, proposition was proved. 0 
Now it is clear that S4.3 meets the conditions of the theorem: we can take the class 
of all finite connected frames as V. and the class of all connected frames with the final 
cluster as C. 
Now consider, for each n, the logic J,, which is the result of adding to S4.2 the 
following axiom schema: 
Intuitively, this schema asserts that there cannot be more than n pairwise incomparable 
worlds, visible from any world. 
A frame (M, R) is said to be of width n if there are no worlds at,. . , a,+~ such 
that for each different i and j, neither a;Raj, nor ojRat. By using standard methods 
of canonical model and the Lemmon filtration (see [3,6,29]), it is straightforward to 
prove that .Z,, is characterized by class of all frames of width n with the final cluster, 
and is determined by the subclass of all finite frames of this class. Also, it is clear that 
JI coincides with S4.3, and that each I,,+! is properly included in I,,. Also, if 3 is of 
width n, then, clearly, 3-* is also of width n, hence all the conditions of theorem B.1 
apply to J,,. We summarize all these observations in a proposition. 
Proposition B.2. There is a sequence of logics {J,,}, such that for each n, S4.2 c J,,, 
J r1+ I is properly contained in J,,, J1 is S4.3. and each Jt is the largest logic in its range. 
There is another well-known class of logics, namely logics of finite depth. A transitive 
and reflexive frame (M, R) has depth at most n , if there is no sequence LYI,. . . , a,,+] 
such that for each i, 1 6 i < n, aiRat+, , but not (Yi+i Rai. Let Z, be a logic determined 
by the class of all frames of depth at most n. All these logics are different and can be 
axiomatized [ 291. Also, using the methods of [ 8,19,29], it is easy to show that each I, 
is also characterized by the class of all frames of depth n. Also, logics Z.2,, which are 
obtained from Z, by adding schema 2, are characterized by classes of frames of depth 
n with the final cluster. It was proved in [ 161 that all logics between S4 and S4F have 
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the same expansions for finite theories. The careful analysis of the proof shows, that it 
is also good for any logic Z,, n b 2, but without restriction for finite theories. Using 
minimal model semantics, even simpler proof can be given. 
Proposition B.3, For each n 2 2, for each A and each T, T is an I,-expansion of A 
if and only if T is an S4F-expansion of A. 
Proof. According to Proposition 4.1, nonmonotonic I,, coincides with nonmonotonic 
1.2, which is I,, with schema 2, so it suffices to prove the proposition for 1.2, in place 
of Z,,. 1.2, is characterized by the class of all frames of depth n which have the final 
cluster. This class is cluster closed, so we can apply the minimal model semantics. 
Clearly, 1.2, is a subsystem of S4F (because all S4F-frames are of depth 2), hence 
each Z.2,-expansion of A is also an S4F-expansion of A. Conversely, assume that T is 
an S4F-expansion of A. Let us prove that T is an Z.2,-expansion, too. Let M = (M, V) 
be the canonical SS-model for T. It suffices to prove that M is &-minimal for A, where 
K,, is a class of all models of depth at most n. Assume that N = (N, R, U) is a Kripke 
model of depth at most n, that N c M. Then for some (Y E N, V, is different from all 
Vp for all /3 E M. For each /3 E N, by rk( /3) (rank of /3) we will denote the maximal 
number m such that there exists a sequence of worlds pt , . . . , Pm such that for each i, 
piRpi+l, but not pi+, RPi. Since N is of depth n, rk( p) is defined and does not exceed 
n for each p E N. Now let m be the smallest number such that for some (Y of rank m, 
V, differs from all V, for all y E M, and (Y is some world of rank m with this property. 
Let M, = {y E N: aRy A yRa}. Consider the S4F-model M, = (M, U M, Q, U), 
where Q = (M, x (M, U M) ) U (M x M) . It follows from the choice of (Y and from 
Proposition 2.2 that for each p E N \ (M, U M), such that cuR/3, for each formula 7, 
(M, p) b Lg if and only if M k Lv. Using this observation, it is straightforward to 
prove by induction on sp that for each p, for each /? E M,, (N, p) + cp if and only 
if (M,, p> k p. Hence we obtain M, k A, and (M,,(Y) k 79, that is, M, c M, 
hence M is not an S4Fminimal model of A, which contradicts our assumption that T 
is an S4F-expansion of A. So we assumed that T is not an I.2,-expansion of A and got 
a contradiction, hence T is an Z.2,-expansion of A. 0 
Thus, the whole bunch of logics of finite depth, contained in S4F, is in the same range. 
Unfortunately, this gives us no final answer to the question, how many different modal 
logics are between S4.3 and S4F, because among such logics there are infinitely many 
logics of infinite depth. Fine [ 21 gives an effective description of these logics in terms 
of Kripke frames which determine the logics. Unfortunately, these classes seemingly do 
not characterize corresponding logics, and do not meet conditions of Theorem B.l, so 
methods of this paper are not applicable directly to that case. 
Interestingly, the situation for logics of depth 2 (that is, those between SW5 and 
S4F) is quite different: there are infinitely many nonmonotonically different logics 
among them. 
Proposition B.4. Let SW5, be a logic determined by a class of all S4F-frames con- 
sisting of two clusters, where the lower cluster has at most m worlds. Then for each 
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HZ, SW,,,~+i is properly contained in SW,, and there is a theory A,, such that some 
SW,,,-expansion of S,,, is not an SW,,,+! -expansion of A,,,. 
The proof is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem 3.5. The complete proof 
is, however, rather long, because to apply minimal model semantics we must show that 
sw5,,, is not only determined, but also characterized by the class of all S4F-frames 
where the cardinality of the lower cluster does not exceed II. This can be done by using 
the canonical model method, see [ 81. 
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